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Protecting River Flows for Fun and 
Profit: Colorado's Unique Water Rights 
for Whitewater Parks 
Reed D. Benson* 
Since 2001, Colorado has recognized a special type of water right for 
whitewater parks, which are constructed within a river channel to provide play 
features for kayakers and other boaters. These water rights, called "recreational 
in-channel diversions, " are unique to Colorado, even though whitewater parks 
exist in several western states. This Article addresses some of the underlying 
reasons that recreational in-channel diversions were established in Colorado, 
and traces the controversy surrounding their recognition by that state's courts 
and legislature. Over the last decade, however, the controversy has largely died 
away, and whitewater park rights have now become an accepted part of 
Colorado water law. This Article reviews these developments, examines the 
policy choices made by the legisldture in enacting two different statutes on 
recreational in-channel diversions, and offers concluding observations 
regarding Colorado's experience with whitewater park water rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Colorado enacted a statute in 20011 recognizing a special type of water right 
for whitewater parks, which are designed and constructed to provide waves and 
holes for playboating2 at a variety of river flow levels. These rights are 
essentially instream flow rights that call for specified flows through the 
constructed course, at levels that provide a fun experience for kayakers and other 
boaters using the park. Unlike more familiar instream flow rights for 
environmental purposes, however, these specialized rights involve diversion or 
control of water using engineered structures in the river channel, and it is these 
structures that produce the park's whitewater features. These special rights, 
called recreational in-channel diversions (RICDs), are unique to Colorado;3 
nearly fifteen years after its legislature recognized these rights, no other state has 
followed suit. 
Whitewater park rights were the subject of intense legal and policy debates 
in Colorado for several years. The legitimacy and size of water right claims for 
these courses was fiercely litigated in that state's unique water courts both before 
and after the 2001 statute. On one side of the fight were local governments and 
water districts that sought to appropriate water for their whitewater parks; on the 
other was a state agency, the Colorado Water Conservation Board (CWCB), that 
fought to defeat or reduce these appropriations. Twice the issue reached the 
Colorado Supreme Court, once ending in a three-to-three deadlock. Years after 
the original RICD statute was enacted, the dispute returned to the Colorado 
legislature, which enacted significant revisions to the law in 2006.4 
Copyright© 2015 Regents of the University of California. 
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( See infra Part ll.B. 
2. Waves and holes are features of a flowing stream that attract whitewater boaters by offering 
certain kinds of action or thrills that are not provided by calm, flat water. Certain waves or holes can 
deliver a particularly fun experience for boaters, especially those who are highly skilled. Boaters generally 
call such features "play spots," and engineered whitewater parks are built to provide readily accessible 
play spots that are fun at various flow levels. "Playboating" is a form of whitewater paddling that involves 
"surfing" and performing various other moves at play spots; some playboaters rarely go downriver at all, 
instead spending all their time at an easily accessible play spot. Whitewater parks facilitate this kind of 
playboating, often called "park and play." 
3. "Colorado is the only state that allows for the appropriation of water rights for recreational 
boating uses associated with man-made whitewater parks, specifically requiring structures in the stream 
that create recreational experiences." COLO. WATER CONSERVATION Bo., COLORADO'S WATER PLAN 245 
(2015), https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/FIN AL-2ndDraftClean-Appendices-2015% 
20Revised.pdf (second draft). 
4. A 2007 article told the "inside story" of these early battles from the perspective of those fighting 
to establish and defend whitewater park rights. Glenn E. Porzak et al., Recreation Water Rights: "The 
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As these debates raged on.in the early years of the twenty-first century, it 
seemed reasonable to conclude, as the Colorado Foundation for Water Education 
did in 2004, "that the controversy over recreational in-channel diversions will 
continue. "5 The record shows, however, that the controversy has all but died over 
the past decade. Today, several whitewater parks in Colorado have established 
water rights, but very few new claims are being filed. Whereas some of the early 
RTCD appropriations were secured only after hard-fought trials in the water 
courts, these claims have more recently been approved on the basis of negotiated 
settlements between RICD claimants and objecting parties. And since enacting 
compromise amendments to the RICD statute in 2006, the legislature has not 
returned to this issue. In short, after a turbulent beginning, whitewater park water 
rights have become an established and accepted part of Colorado water law. 
RI CDs are unique to Colorado, but whitewater parks are not. In other words, 
only one state allows whitewater parks to appropriate the water they need to 
function. Colorado has long been a leader in the development of western water 
law, and the acceptance of whitewater park rights there suggests that other states 
should consider following Colorado's lead on this issue. 
Colorado's experience with these special water rights offers potentially 
relevant lessons for other western states with important recreational rivers. First, 
Colorado recognized these high-volume water rights even as it was facing the 
need to develop additional water supplies for its growing cities in the twenty-
first century. Second, Colorado came to recognize these water rights because it 
believes in the right of users to appropriate all available water, and gives limited 
roles to state agencies and little weight to policy arguments in the determination 
of water rights. Third, the Colorado legislature made important policy choices in 
setting the legal framework for whitewater park rights, recognizing RICDs, 
imposing some key restrictions, and rejecting others. Fourth, the acceptance of 
RI CDs after years of initial controversy suggests that other western states should 
consider allowing whitewater parks to obtain water rights on terms similar to 
those of Colorado. 
Part I of this Article summarizes consumptive and nonconsumptive water 
uses in Colorado and briefly outlines the state's water laws and institutions as 
they relate to new appropriations. Part II traces Colorado's recognition of water 
rights for whitewater parks in the courts and the legislature, focusing largely on 
the role of the CWCB and the policy choices of the legislature as expressed in 
the 2001 and 2006 statutes. Part III examines the status of RICD issues in 
Colorado today, and Part IV offers concluding observations regarding 
Colorado's experience. 
Inside Story," 10 U. DENY. WATER L. REV. 209 (2007). The authors represented local governments 
claiming whitewater park rights. Since their 2007 article, relatively little has been written about RICDs. 
5. Colo. Found. for Water Educ. Staff, Recreation: Whitewater Parks Recognized as State's 
Newest Beneficial Use, HEADWATERS, Spring 2004, at 12, 13, http://issuu.com/cfwe/docs/ 
spring2004magazine/0 (scroll right to screens 7 and 9 of 13). 
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I. WATER USES AND WATER LAW IN COLORADO 
Fifteen years after the enactment of the original RICO statute, Colorado 
remains the only state to recognize appropriations for whitewater boating 
courses. Colorado has been called the "Mother of Rivers,"6 but why did it 
become the birthplace of a unique type of recreational water right? The reasons 
have to do partly with Colorado's economy and values, but also with some 
unusual aspects of its water laws and institutions. 
A, Consumptive and Nonconsumptive Water Uses in Colorado 
The dominant consumptive water use in Colorado, dwarfing all others 
combined, is irrigation. According to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), 
irrigation accounted for nearly 89 percent of Colorado's water withdrawals in 
2010.7 The percentage is the same in terms of water actually consumed_8 The 
share of Colorado's water used for irrigation seems especially high given that the 
great majority of Coloradans live in cities, 9 and that agriculture accounts for a 
tiny fraction of Colorado's economy.to 
Colorado's second highest water use is public water supply, including water 
delivered for use in cities and towns. I I Public water suppliers used about 950,000 
6. Greg Hobbs, a water law scholar, poet, and Colorado Supreme Court justice, chose "Mother of 
Rivers" as the title for a book of water poems. GREG HOBBS, COLORADO MOTHER OF RIVERS: WATER 
POEMS (2005). 
7. MOLLY A. MAUPIN ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN THE 
UNITED STATES IN 2010, at 11 (2014), http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1405/pdf/circ 1405.pdf (10.9 million acre-
feet of irrigation withdrawals out of a total of 12.3 million acre-feet). By contrast, aquaculture and self-
supplied industrial uses each accounted for just over one percent of withdrawals, while power plants and 
self-supplied domestic uses combined for around I percent. Id. 
8. COLO. WATER CONSERVATION Bo., supra note 3, at 79. Not all of the water withdrawn from a 
river or aquifer for a particular use is actually consumed by that use. The USGS defines "consumptive 
use" ( or water consumed) as "The part of water withdrawn that is evaporated, transpired, incorporated 
into products or crops, consumed by humans or livestock, or otherwise removed from the immediate water 
environment." MAUPIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 49. 
9. As of the 2010 Census, over 86 percent of Colorado's population was living in "Urbanized 
Areas" of fifty thousand people or more. 2010 Census Urban and Rural Classification: Percent by State, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www2.census.gov/geo/docs/reference/ua/PctUrbanRural_State,x1s (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2015); Urban and Rural Classification, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/ 
geo/reference/urban-rural.html (last updated July 27, 2015) (defining "Urbanized Areas"). 
I 0. According to the Department of Commerce, the "Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting" 
sector accounted for slightly less than 1.2 percent of Colorado's economic output in 2013. Current-Dollar 
GDP by State: Colorado (2013), BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/itable/iTable.cfm? 
ReqlD=70&step=l#reqid=70&step=l&isuri=l (last visited Sept. 24, 2015) (click "Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) by State" tab; then follow "GDP in current dollars" hyperlink; then follow "Next Step" 
hyperlink; then follow "Next Step" hyperlink; then select "Colorado" under "Area" and follow "Next 
Step" hyperlink; then select "2013" under "Year" and follow "Next Step" hyperlink) (showing output for 
this sectorof slightly above $3 billion as of the end of 2013, while the total state Gross Domestic Product 
was slightly below $300 billion). 
11. According to the CWCB, public water supply accounts for around 8 percent of water consumed 
in Colorado. See COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., supra note 3, at 79. USGS figures for public water 
supply cover "water withdrawn by public and private water suppliers that provide water to at least [twenty-
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acre-feetl2 in 2010, accounting for nearly 8 percent of Colorado's water 
withdrawals,13 and serving 94 percent of its population.14 According to the 
USGS, Colorado's public water suppliers used almost 6 percent less water in 
2010 than in 2000, even though they served nearly a million more people. 15 
Going forward, however, Colorado's municipal and industrial water demands are 
projected to grow to around 1.4 million acre-feet by 2035 and potentially exceed 
1.8 million acre-feet by 2050--nearly double current levels--depending on the 
magnitude of population growth and climate change.16 
Nonconsumptive water uses such as fishing, birdwatching, and recreational 
boating are harder to quantify, 17 but are certainly important activities nearly 
everywhere in Colorado. 18 The CWCB says that local water plans have identified 
13,557 miles of streams as environmental or recreational "focus areas,"19 
although even this total may be low.20 These uses have significant economic 
value for the state, as summarized in the CWCB's draft Colorado Water Plan: 
The importance of Colorado's natural environment and recreational 
opportunities to its quality of life and to its economy cannot be overstated. 
Outdoor recreation (including hunting, fishing, biking, hiking, skiing, 
golfing, wildlife watching and many other types of outdoor activities) 
significantly contributes to Colorado's economy, with nonconsumptive 
five] people or have a minimum of[fifteen] connections ... delivered to users for domestic, commercial, 
and industrial purposes .... " MAUPIN ET AL.,supra note 7, at 18. 
12. An acre-foot is a unit of volume; the amount of water needed to cover an acre of land one foot 
deep. An acre-foot is equivalent to 325,851 gallons or 43,560 cubic feet. MAUPIN ET AL.,supra note 7, at 
iv. 
13. Id. at 11. 
14. Id. at 19. 
15. Id. (848 million gallons per day io serve 4.72 million people in 2010); SUSAN S. HUTSON ET 
AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CIRCULAR NO. 1268, ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN THE UNITED STATES 
IN 2000, at 14 (2004) (899 million gallons per day to serve 3.75 million people in 2000). 
16. COLO. WATER CONSERVATION Bo., supra note 3, at 80 fig.5-2 (showing low, medium, and 
high demand for municipal and industrial water use in 2050 "with range of climate change increases"). 
Colorado officials project the state's population ofS.2 million will grow to more than 8 million, potentially 
even exceeding 10 million, by 2050. COLO. WATER CONSERVATION Bo., COLORADO'S WATER SUPPLY 
FUTURE 4-3 (2011 ), http://cwcb.state.co.us/water-management/water-supply-planning!Documents/SWS 
12010/SWSI201 O.pdf. 
17. The USGS does not include estimates for nonconsumptive water uses in its quinquennial 
reports on water use in the United States. MAUPIN ET AL., supra note 7, at SO (defining instream use and 
noting that past reports had included estimates for water used for hydropower, but that this was 
discontinued after the 2000 report). 
18. COLO.WATER CONSERVATION Bo., supra note 3, at 13 7 (summarizing locally-developed water 
resource plans from each of Colorado's major river basins, and noting that every one of these plans has 
"indicated that meeting [the basin's] environmental and recreational needs is an important aspect" of the 
plan). The CWCB notes "[w]ater is a crucial element in maintaining the environmental and recreational 
values important to Coloradans. Adequate streamflows support the outstanding fisheries in the upper 
Arkansas River, rafting through Glenwood Canyon [ on the Colorado River], snowmaking for world-class 
ski areas, and maintaining habitat for the water-dependent natural environment." Id. at 242. 
19. Id. at 137-39. 
20. The criteria for being named a "focus area" were presence of cutthroat trout, warm water fish, 
or important "riparian and wetland areas." Id. at 137-38. However, other factors, such as brown trout or 
whitewater boating, might make a stream reach significant for recreational use. 
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water-based recreation an important part of that economy. Healthy 
watersheds, rivers and streams, and wildlife are vital to maintaining 
Colorado's quality oflife and a robust economy.21 
While the total economic value of water-based recreation is difficult to 
quantify, it certainly generates significant dollars for Colorado. According to a 
2012 report by the nonprofit group Protect the Flows,22 recreational activities 
along Colorado's western slope rivers and streams produced over $6 billion in 
direct spending in 2011 with a total economic output approaching $10 billion.23 
Since these figures cover only the Colorado River and its tributaries,24 they 
certainly understate the statewide economic impact by leaving out some of 
Colorado's most important recreational rivers; for example, the Arkansas has 
been called the most rafted river in the world.25 The economic benefits ofwater-
dependent recreation are most significant for communities such as Glenwood 
Springs, Gunnison, and Salida located along rivers that are tremendously popular 
with anglers and whitewater boaters alike. 
Despite the importance of recreational water uses in Colorado, they have 
not traditionally been well supported or protected by state water law. When the 
Colorado Supreme Court had to decide if property owners have the right to 
exclude rafters from rivers flowing through private lands, the court favored 
private property over the "right to float,"26 taking a narrower view of public 
access rights than the high courts of neighboring states. 27 Colorado also refused 
to allow instream water rights for recreational uses, even after it recognized such 
rights to protect the environment, as explained in the next subpart. 
B. Water Laws and Water Institutions in Colorado 
Colorado has been a leader, and arguably the leader, in the development of 
western water law since the nineteenth century. Its 1876 constitution not only 
21. Id. at 241. 
22. The group describes itself as "a coalition of businesses that seek to maintain a healthy and 
flowing Colorado River system." PROTECT THE FLOWS, http://www.protectflows.com (last visited Sept. 
27, 2015). 
23. SOUTHWICK Assocs., ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS OF OUTDOOR RECREATION ON THE 
COLORADO RIVER AND ITS TRIBUTARIES 3 (2012), http://www.protectflows.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2012/05/Colorado-River-Recreational-Economic-lmpacts-Southwick-Associates-5-3-12 _ 2. pdf. 
Camping, snow sports, and wildlife viewing were the top three activities in dollar terms, contributing a 
majority of the total economic output of $9.577 billion. Fishing and water sports (such as rafting and 
kayaking) were fifth and sixth, with economic outputs of$835 million and $739 million, respectively. Id. 
at 31. 
24. Id. at 7 (describing rivers covered by the study, including the mainstem Colorado, Green, 
Gunnison, San Juan, Yampa, and others). 
25. COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., supra note 3, at 38. 
26. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1029-30 (Colo. 1979). 
27. See, e.g., Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984); State e.x rel. 
State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421 (N.M. 1945); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 
137 (Wyo. 1961). 
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enshrined prior appropriation28 as the water law of the state, but also declared 
that the "right to appropriate ... shall never be denied."29 A few years later, in 
the famous case of Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 30 the Colorado Supreme Court 
held that Colorado from its earliest days had allocated water solely by prior 
appropriation declining to recognize the eastern system of riparian water rights. 31 
The court's rejection of riparian rights as anathema to arid regions originated the 
so-called "Colorado Doctrine'' of pure prior appropriation, which was followed 
by the other states of the Mountain West.32 
Colorado water law today is primarily statutory, set forth in a detailed water 
code based on the Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969.33 
In many respects, Colorado's water code is similar to those of other western 
states that allocate and manage water under the prior appropriation doctrine. 
Colorado law is unique, however, regarding the process and standards for 
obtaining new water rights. As to the process, Colorado is famous in water law 
circles as the only state that does not require a state-issued permit as a 
precondition of making a new appropriation.34 As to the standards, Colorado 
does not impose any "public interest" test on applications for new water rights.35 
In nearly all other prior appropriation states, the responsible water agency must 
find that a proposed use of water would not harm the public interest before 
issuing a permit for that use;36 in Colorado, the water code has no such 
28. The prior appropriation doctrine grew up in the American West of the nineteenth century and 
became the primary basis of western state water law. DAVID H. GETCHES, w ATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 
77-78 (4th ed. 2009). Under traditional prior appropriation, a person could establish a right to use water 
by intending to appropriate, diverting water from its natural course, and applying it to a beneficial use. Id. 
The user would thereby obtain a right to continue using the amount of water needed for the specific use 
to which the water was applied. Id. If total demands for water exceed the amount available in the source 
at a particular time, the available water goes to those whose uses were established at the earliest date, 
under the priority principle of"first in time, first in right." Id. 
29. Specifically, it states that unappropriated water is "the property of the public ... dedicated to 
the use of the people of the state, subject to appropriation," COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5, and that the right 
to appropriate the unappropriated waters of natural streams of the state for beneficial use shall never be 
denied. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6. 
30. 6 Colo. 443 (1882). 
31. Id. at 447. 
32. See A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN LAW AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 130 (7th ed. 2014) (explaining that the "Colorado Doctrine" is a pure form of prior 
appropriation, followed in those states that never recognized water rights based on the eastern common 
law doctrine of riparian rights). 
33. COLO. REV. STAT.§§ 37-92-101 to 37-92-602 (2015). 
34. See TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 32, at 203. In Colorado, a "conditional decree" serves the 
same purposes as a permit from the appropriator's standpoint, in that it holds a priority date for a quantity 
of water that has not yet been applied to beneficial use, but it is unlike a permit in that a conditional decree 
is not a prerequisite to a valid appropriation. GETCHES, supra note 28, at 94-95. 
35. See Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado Water Law: An Historical Overview, I U. DENY. WATER 
L. REV. I, 22 (1997). 
36. This is true for all the permit states except Oklahoma, which once had a public interest test but 
eliminated it in 1963. Colorado and Oklahoma today are the two appropriation states without a public 
interest standard. Douglas L. Grant, Two Models of Public Interest Review of Water A/location in the 
West, 9 V. DENY. WATER L. REV. 485,486 nn.1-2 (2006). 
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requirement, and the courts that decide on new appropriations are not to consider 
public interest factors except as provided by statute.37 
Applying prior appropriation principles, Colorado courts were at best 
reluctant to recognize appropriations for water flowing in its natural course, even 
when such claims were supported by strong policy arguments. For example, in 
Empire Water & Power v. Cascade Town Corp.38 a federal court applying 
Colorado law did not allow a major resort near Colorado Springs to protect the 
natural flows of a waterfall-the scenic highlight of the resort-from being 
diverted by a proposed upstream hydropower project. The Empire Water & 
Power court recognized the economic value of the resort, the investments made 
by its owners,39 and even the public benefits associated with rest and 
recreation,40 but nevertheless refused to protect the flows of the waterfall 
because it believed the water laws of Colorado "proceed along more material 
lines."41 Likewise, many years later the Colorado Supreme Court rejected a 
water. district's claim for instream flows to support an important recreational 
fishery on the Colorado River.42 The court held that diverting water from the 
river was needed to effect a valid appropriation, even though a state statute 
specifically authorized the district to "file upon and hold for the use of the public 
sufficient water of any natural stream to maintain a constant stream flow in the 
amount necessary to preserve fish."43 
Colorado provided for instream flow appropriations by statute in 1973,44 
but restricted these rights in three major ways. First, it authorized "minimum 
stream flow" rights only for purposes of environmental protection,45 leaving out 
such values as aesthetics and recreation. Second, it effectively limited the amount 
of water that could be appropriated for this purpose by providing for 
establishment of minimum flows only "to preserve the natural environment to a 
3 7. "A public interest argument is not a valid objection to a [proposed new appropriation] because 
such an argument conflicts with the doctrine of prior appropriation." Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. 
v. Hines Highlands Ltd. P'ship, 929 P.2d 718, 725 (Colo. 1996). 
38. 205 F. 123 (8th Cir. 1913) (applying Colorado law). 
39. Id. at 128 (noting that the private resort featured a "railroad station, hotels, cottages, 
waterworks, park, roads, and trails," and attracted 12,000 to 15,000 visitors per year). 
40. The court had no trouble finding that the resort's use of water was "beneficial," stating, 
"[p]laces such as that described here, favored by climatic conditions, improved by the work of man, and 
designed to promote health by affording rest and relaxation are assuredly beneficial .... They are a 
recognized feature of the times, are important in their influence upon health, and multitudes of people 
avail themselves of them from necessity." Id. 
41. Id. at 129. In other words, the court believed Colorado's water laws were aimed primarily at 
ensuring water supplies for extractive beneficial uses such as irrigation, mining, and domestic water 
supply. 
42. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co., 406 P.2d 798 (Colo. 
1965). 
43. Id. at 799-801. 
44. Act of Apr. 23, 1973, ch. 442, 1973 Colo. Sess. Laws 1521 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 
37-92-102 to 37-92-103, 37-92-302 (2015)). 
45. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2015) (providing for minimum instream flow rights as 
needed "to preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree"). 
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reasonable degree."46 Third, and perhaps most importantly, it allowed only a 
single state agency, the CWCB, to obtain and hold instream flow water rights 
"for any purpose whatsoever."47 
Another unique feature of Colorado's water rights system is its water courts, 
which have exclusive jurisdiction to determine new appropriations and a variety 
of other "water matters. "48 These specialized courts, one for each of seven 
"divisions" corresponding generally to the state's major river basins,49 decide 
these matters through judicial proceedings that may involve many parties. In 
addition to the applicant, there are often multiple objectors which are typically 
water right holders in the area affected by the proposed use, all of whom may 
offer evidence and argument regarding the application. 50 Water court decisions 
are in the form of decrees, which are appealed directly to the Colorado Supreme 
Court,51 giving the high court of Colorado an unusually prominent role in 
interpreting and applying state water law. 
By contrast, state agencies play only a limited role in the determination of 
water rights in Colorado. The State Engineer is responsible for the administration 
of water rights once they have been established,52 but does not determine the 
existence or parameters of those rights in the first instance. The Office of the 
State Engineer plays an advisory role in the early stages of water court 
proceedings, 53 but once a matter reaches a formal hearing before a water judge, 
the statute provides only that "[t]he division engineer shall appear to furnish 
pertinent information and may be examined by any party .... "54 The State 
Engineer, the CWCB, and other agencies may be parties to water court 
proceedings, but their official status in such proceedings is no different from a 
46. Id. (emphasis added). 
47. The statute provides that only the CWCB may hold a right "for instream flows in a stream 
channel between specific points, or for natural surface water levels or volumes for natural lakes, for any 
purpose whatsoever." Id. 
48. COLO. REV. STAT.§ 37-92-203{1) (2015). 
49. COLO. REV. STAT.§ 37-92-201 (2015). 
50. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 32, at 203. 
51. Id. This is notable because Colorado has an intermediate appellate court-the Court of 
Appeals-but it does not hear appeals of water court decrees. 
52. Administration would include enforcing priority calls, ensuring that water rights are being 
exercised in accordance with their terms, etc. See COLO. REV. STAT.§ 37-92-301 (2015). 
53. COLO. REV. STAT.§ 37-92-302(4)(2015). The statute calls for the water referee (who is not the 
water judge, but is an official of the water court), in conducting an investigation of a water right 
application, to "consult" with the State Engineer or division engineer. id. The consulted official is to file 
a report with the referee, which in tum is sent to all parties. Id. If the matter proceeds to the water judge 
before this consultation occurs, the division engineer is to "file a written recommendation in the 
proceedings," and that recommendation goes to all the parties. Id. Finally, the statute allows the water 
judge to "request such written report from the state engineer if the water judge desires." Id. 
54. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-304(3) (2015). In discussing this same language, Professor John 
Carlson wrote in 1973 that the statute gave the division engineer a limited role before the water court, 
focusing on disputed factual issues rather than policy questions. John Undem Carlson, Report to Governor 
John A. Love on Certain Colorado Water Problems, 50 DENV. L.J. 293, 326-27 (1973) ("[H]is role seems 
to be that of an aide to the court in determining the truth of the matters asserted."). 
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private entity.55 Unlike the other western states, where the water agency makes 
water right decisions subject to possible judicial review of the agency's action 
under familiar principles of administrative law,56 in Colorado such decisions are 
made exclusively in the courts. 
The CWCB has a multifaceted mission regarding Colorado's waters-the 
statute that lays out the agency's powers and duties specifies twenty different 
authorities57_but the dominant word in the statute is "utilization." The purpose 
of CWCB programs is "to secure the greatest utilization of such waters and the 
utmost prevention of floods,"58 and the agency is authorized to take a range of 
actions for purposes of promoting such water utilization. 59 As for water rights, 
the CWCB is authorized to file applications to appropriate water,60 to "take all 
action necessary to acquire or perfect water rights for projects sponsored by the 
board,"61 and is the only entity that may apply for and hold minimum stream 
55. § 37-92-302(1)(b) (providing that "any person, including the state engineer" may file a 
statement of opposition to a water right application); see also§ 37-92-304(2) (providing that "any person, 
including the state engineer," may file in the water court to support or oppose a referee's ruling). The 
statutory difference between the State Engineer (or other agency) and a private party is that state agencies 
are excused from paying filing fees.§ 37-92-302(1)(d). 
56. See, e.g., Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 252 P.3d 71, 77-78 (Idaho 2011) (explaining 
that a reviewing court must affirm agency decision unless it was contrary to constitution, statute, or 
required procedure, "not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole," or "arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion," and that the court cannot substitute its views for the agency's on 
factual issues); Office of the State Eng'r v. Morris, 819 P.2d 203, 205 (Nev. 1991) (explaining that a 
reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for that of State Engineer, or reweigh evidence, but only 
ask if substantial evidence in the record supports the decision, and that decisions of State Engineer are 
presumed correct on judicial review); Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 11 P.3d 726, 733 (Wash. 
2000) (stating that the court reviews agency record and may reverse if agency has made an error oflaw, 
if agency's order is not supported by substantial evidence, or if decision is arbitrary and capricious, and 
that party challenging agency action bears the burden of establishing invalidity). New Mexico is unusual 
in that its constitution provides for de novo review of state agency decisions "in matters relating to water 
rights." N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 5. 
57. COLO. REV. STAT.§ 37-60-106 (2015)(stating powers and duties of the board in subsections I 
and 2; subsection I has parts running from (a) through (t), although (s) was repealed by the failure of a 
referendum). 
58. § 37-60-106(1 ). 
59. These activities include: 
devis[ing] and formulat[ing] methods, means, and plans for bringing about the greater 
utilization of the waters of the state .... cooperat[ing] with the United States and the agencies 
thereof, and with other states for the purpose of bringing about the greater utilization of the 
waters of the state of Colorado .... fonnulat[ing] and prepar[ing] drafts of legislation, state 
and federal, designed to assist in securing greater beneficial use and utilization of the waters 
of the state .... [; and] investigat[ing] and assist[ing] in formulating a response to the plans, 
purposes, procedures, requirements, laws, proposed laws, or other activities of the federal 
government and other states which affect or might affect the use or development of the water 
resources of this state. 
§ 37-60-106(l)(c), (e), (g}-(h). Several of these provisions also provide parallel authority for purposes of 
promoting flood control. 
60. § 37-60-106(1 )(m). 
61. § 37-60-l06(I)(n). 
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flow appropriations.62 But the statutes do not give the CWCB special powers or 
duties in the determination of water rights,63 leaving that job to the water courts. 
The limited role of state agencies in the appropriations process reflects 
Colorado's longstanding philosophy on water rights and government. That 
philosophy is embodied in the Colorado Constitution, which states without 
qualification that "the right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural 
stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied."64 Requiring a state-issued 
permit for new water uses would arguably violate this constitutional "right to 
appropriate."65 Even a statute empowering a state agency to raise "public 
interest" concerns to the water courts in cases regarding new appropriations 
would likely face a constitutional challenge. 66 In broad terms, Colorado's 
philosophy is that water is a resource that is freely available for private uses, that 
any Colorado citizen can and should be able to appropriate water for any 
beneficial use, 67 and that water is best allocated through the actions of water 
developers and users (and reallocated, if necessary, through market forces).68 
Under this view, government involvement in decisions about water rights would 
62. COLO. REV. STAT.§ 37-92-102(3) (2015) (giving the CWCB "exclusive authority" to hold 
minimum stream flow rights). As Melinda Kassen notes, this environmental protection role is "somewhat 
ironic(], given the CWCB's clear development mission." Melinda Kassen, Statutory Expansion a/State 
Agencies' Authority to Administer and Develop Water Resources in Response to Colorado's Drought, 7 
U. DENY. WATER L. REV. 47, 80 (2003). 
63. The CWCB does have some special duties regarding RICO applications, however, as explained 
below. See infra notes 136-141 (describing the judicial determination of the CWCB 's role in Colo. Water 
Conservation Bd. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., 109 P.3d 585, 589 (Colo. 2005)); 
infra notes 154-157 and accompanying text (explaining the changes to the CWCB's role enacted by S.B. 
06-037, 65th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006)). 
64. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6. 
65. See, e.g., GETCHES, supra note 28, at 166 (noting that Colorado's rejection of permit 
requirement "reflects Colorado's interpretation" of this provision of the state constitution, "which is 
similar to that of several other western states"). The author of Water Law in a Nutshell, David H. Getches, 
was a longtime University of Colorado law professor and one of the foremost scholars of Colorado water 
law. 
66. See Carlson, supra note 54, at 330. 
67. The exception, of course, is minimum stream flows, which by statute may only be appropriated 
and held by the CWCB. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (explaining the minimum 
streamflow restrictions contained in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-102(3)). 
68. With few exceptions, the law still reflects the view that John Carlson summarized in the early 
1970s, not long after Colorado's 1969 water statute: 
The existing water law of Colorado does not recognize the possibility that appropriators may 
seek to develop water rights which, although beneficial uses under existing law, are 
nonetheless socially undesirable for the public at large. If the use is "beneficial" in terms of 
the applicant's economic needs, that suffices. The water law now assumes that all growth and 
development give rise to "beneficial" uses of water, and in allocating the water, awards the 
first claimant. Thereafter the free market may cause a shift in uses, but the law is not concerned 
with the merit or demerit of the choice the market makes. 
Carlson, supra note 54, at 324-25. 
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undermine prior appropriation and surely do more harm than good, 69 and this 
philosophy still predominates in Colorado water law. 
In sum, Colorado is a bellwether state for water policy not only because it 
has strongly influenced western water law, but also because its water demands 
and values are generally similar to those of others in the region. Like many other 
western states, Colorado devotes the great majority of its water to irrigation, but 
its rapidly growing population is fueling demands for new municipal water 
supplies. Recreational water uses are important in Colorado, partly for economic 
reasons, and outdoor amenities are a significant part of the state's thriving and 
increasingly diversified economy. And Colorado's water law, while based on 
prior appropriation as in other western states, reflects a belief in private initiative 
and a limited role for government. All of these elements of Colorado's water 
reality influenced the development of the law regarding water rights for 
whitewater parks, which Part 11 briefly traces through 2006. 
II. JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE RECOGNITION OF RECREATIONAL 
WATER RIGHTS 
Colorado first recognized "in-channel" recreational water rights in the 
1990s. This recognition came not from legislation or agency policy, but from 
judicial decisions that confirmed such rights as valid appropriations under 
existing state water law. From modest beginnings, in-channel rights soon grew 
in number and size as cities sought to appropriate water for engineered in-
channel courses specially designed for whitewater kayaking. The success of such 
claims generated major controversy in Colorado, resulting in the state legislature 
enacting two measures that both recognized and limited these rights. This Part 
briefly traces the development of Colorado law on these water rights, focusing 
on their original recognition by the courts, the CWCB's role in the determination 
of recreational claims, and some of the key policy choices made by the Colorado 
legislature. 
A. Judicial Recognition: Thornton v. Fort Collins and the Early Kayak Course 
Cases 
The Cache la Poudre River flows through the heart of Fort Collins, 
Colorado, and in the 1980s, the city sought to maintain flow levels in this 
important recreational river.70 Fort Collins originally asked the water court to 
69. "Traditionally, water users have viewed state governmental interference with the appropriation 
of Colorado's water resources, other than for purposes ofadministration, as 'completely inconsistent with 
the constitutionally mandated doctrine of prior appropriation."' Kassen, supra note 62, at 52 ( quoting 
Gregory J. Hobbs & Bennett W. Raley, Water Rights Protection in Water Quality Law, 60 U. Cow. L. 
REV. 841,886 (1989)). 
70. A stretch of the river flowing through Poudre Canyon above Fort Collins is Colorado's only 
wild and scenic river, and is very popular for angling, whitewater boating, and other forms of recreation. 
Attractions: Poudre Canyon, VISIT FORT COLLINS, http://www.visitftcollins.com/attractions/poudre-
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recognize its claims as "in-stream water rights" for the portion of the river 
flowing through town-which it called the "Poudre River Recreation 
Corridor"-and indicated that its plans did not involve any diversion from the 
river.71 These claims seemingly violated Colorado's minimum stream flow 
statute ( described above), 72 which did not allow a city to obtain such water 
rights.73 The claims drew opposition from the CWCB and several other parties, 
whose primary objection was that the city was unlawfuliy seeking minimum 
stream flow rights. 74 
Following negotiations with the CWCB, Fort Collins amended its claims by 
adding two "diversion structures" that would not actually remove water from the 
river but instead would direct or concentrate it within the channel to serve the 
city's purposes.75 The city had recently built the lower structure, the "Nature 
Dam," to redirect the river back into its historic channel; the river had shifted due 
to flooding in 1983-84 and restoring the river to its former course was part of 
the city's plans for a new nature center and associated recreational facilities.76 
The upper structure, the "Power Dam," was an existing diversion beside the 
historic municipal power plant in downtown Fort Collins and was located near 
several parks. 77 The court noted that the city had recently "renovated the Power 
Dam by strengthening the structure itself and by adding a boat chute and fish 
ladder designed for recreational use and piscatorial preservation respectively."78 
By dropping any reference to instream water rights and adding these structures, 
Fort Collins sought to bring its claims within the bounds of existing statutes that 
recognized appropriations based on diversion of water and application to 
beneficial use. 79 
canyon (last visited Sept. 26, 2015) (promoting the river and the canyon as scenic and recreational 
amenities of the Fort Collins area). 
71. City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 919-20 (Colo. 1992). 
72. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (explaining the minimum streamtlow restrictions 
in § 37-92-102(3)). 
73. If it were not already clear that only the CWCB could obtain "in-stream" water rights, the 
Colorado legislature removed any doubt in 1987. See City of Thornton, 830 P.2d at 930 (citing Senate Bill 
212, ch. 269, 1987 Colo. Sess. Laws 1305, 1305-06 (codified at§ 37-92-102(3))). Fort Collins had filed 
its claims at the end of 1986. Id. at 919. 
74. Id. at 920. 
75. The city was able to reach a settlement with the CWCB by agreeing to recast its claims as more 
traditional, diversionary water rights. Id. Most of the other objectors also dropped out after the city 
amended its claims. Id. at 921. 
76. Id. at 920. "Nature Dam" was the court's short form name for the Fort Collins Nature Center 
Diversion Dam. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 921 (quoting the amended application, stating that the city's purpose was always "to 
divert, as defined by statute, within the river's natural course or location, or otherwise capture, possess 
and control water for the described beneficial uses"). 
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On appeal of the water court's decree recognizing the city's appropriation,80 
the Colorado Supreme Court had no trouble finding that recreation, fish, and 
wildlife were legally recognized beneficial uses.81 The major question regarding 
the validity of the claims82 was whether the Nature Dam and Power Dam were 
diversion structures that were legally adequate to support an appropriation.83 
After finding that "[a] diversion in the conventional sense is not required" for a 
valid appropriation,84 the court quoted the statutory definition of "diversion," 
which "means removing water from its natural course or location, or controlling 
water in its natural course or location" by means of a "structure or device."85 The 
court interpreted the statute to mean that "[ c ]ontrolling water within its natural 
course or location by some structure or device for a beneficial use thus may result 
in a valid appropriation."86 Both the Nature Dam and the Power Dam could meet 
that test-the Nature Dam by redirecting the flow of the Poudre back into its 
historic channel,87 and the Power Dam by providing a boat chute to "allow 
kayaks or other flotation devices to pass through the Power Dam," and a fish 
ladder to "assist fish to scale the Power Dam."88 
Those opposing Fort Collins' claim contended that the city was merely 
seeking a thinly disguised and illegitimate minimum stream flow-an argument 
made stronger by the city's original claim.89 The Colorado Supreme Court 
pointedly rejected that argument, distinguishing the city's claim from a CWCB 
minimum stream flow because the latter requires no diversion and typically 
involves none, whereas the city employed structures to control water for a 
recognized beneficial use. It did not matter, said the court, that the intended 
beneficial use required the water to remain in the river90 or that such an 
appropriation might serve purposes that a minimum stream flow also would: 
80. The water court decree was only a partial victory for Fort Collins, as it denied an appropriation 
for the Power Darn. id. at 919,932. 
81. The court simply quoted the statutory definition of beneficial use and then observed, "[t]his 
statute provides that water appropriated for municipal, recreational, piscatorial, fishery, and wildlife 
purposes is water put to beneficial uses." Id. at 930 (citing COLO. REV. STAT.§ 37-92-103(4) (2015)). 
82. Two of the three major issues on appeal related to the priority of the right rather than the validity 
of the appropriation. See id. 922-23 (whether amended application, filed in 1988, could relate back to the 
original 1986 filing), 924-29 (whether water court was correct in awarding a 1986 priority date for the 
Nature Dam appropriation). 
83. The water court had held that the Nature Dam effected a valid diversion of water, but the Power 
Dam did not. See id. at 929, 932. 
84. Id. at 929. 
85. Id. at 929-30 (quoting§ 37-92-103(7)'s definition of"diversion" or "divert"). 
86. Id. at 930. 
87. Id. at 931. 
88. Id. at 932. The court reversed the water court's determination that the Power Dam would not 
divert or control water within the meaning of the statute, and stated that, if the boat chute and fish ladder 
actually controlled water to serve their intended purposes, that would be legally sufficient. The Colorado 
Supreme Court remanded the matter to the water court to "for a conclusive determination as to whether 
the boat chute and fish ladder can and will put water to beneficial use." Id. 
89. Id. at 929. 
90. "The type of beneficial use to which the controlled water is put may mean that the water must 
remain in its natural course." Id. at 931. 
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"Although controlling water within its natural course or location by some 
structure or device may effect a result which is similar to a minimum flow, that 
does not mean that the appropriation effected by the structure is invalid under the 
Act."91 
Fort Collins established a key precedent by using structures to appropriate 
water for use in the river channel, but its claim of fifty-five cubic feet per second 
( cfs )92 was a relatively modest amount of water. 93 By holding that a boat chute 
could provide the legally required control of water for a recognized beneficial 
use, however, the Colorado Supreme Court laid a solid foundation for cities to 
appropriate water for whitewater parks, specially designed and constructed to 
provide whitewater features for kayak playboating at a range of flow Jevels.94 
The first city to pursue an appropriation for such a facility was Golden, and in 
1998 it filed a claim for a large amount of water-up to 1000 cfs-for its new 
downtown whitewater park on Clear Creek.95 
Golden's application drew opposition from several water users, but 
eventually all of them withdrew or settled, leaving the CWCB and the State 
Engineer as the only objectors.96 The CWCB fought the application hard in the 
water court, challenging both the legality of the appropriation and the amount of 
water claimed.97 Golden contended that its appropriation was consistent with the 
Fort Collins precedent, that its claimed flows were reasonable because the city 
wanted a world-class whitewater course (not just minimally adequate flows for 
kayaking), and that the course would generate major econornic benefits for the 
city.98 
Golden prevailed in the water court, and the decree not only recognized the 
kayak course as a legitimate appropriation under Fort Co/lins,99 but also awarded 
91. Id. 
92. A cubic foot per second (cfs) is a measure of the flow of water, commonly applied to rivers and 
larger water rights. It is equal to 448.8 gallons per minute, and a flow of I cfs for twenty-four hours will 
deliver a volume of just under two acre-feet. TARWCK ET AL, supra note 32, at 889; see also supra note 
12 and accompanying text. 
93. City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 919 (Colo. 1992). The final decree, 
however, awarded Fort Collins 30 cfs from May through August, and only 5 cfs during the other eight 
months. See Kenneth W. Knox, Colorado Whitewater Courses and Water Rights, THE WATER REPORT, 
Aug. 15, 2006, at I, 4, http://cwcbweblink.state.co.us/WebLink/DocView.aspx?id=l40262&page=1&& 
dbid=O (noting that the historic daily flow in the river at Fort Collins is 213 cfs in May, 425 cfs in June, 
and 112 cfs in July). 
94. City of Thornton, 830 P.2d at 932. 
95. Porzak et al., supra note 4, at 214-15 (explaining origins of Golden's kayak course and its 
water right claim). The original course had seven structures in the channel of Clear Creek, requiring four 
thousand tons of rock and eight hundred tons of grout or cement. Id. at 214. 
96. The water users included two towns, two cities, a county, a ski company, and Coors Brewing, 
all of which withdrew their statements ofopposition or entered into stipulations with Golden. In re Water 
Rights of the City of Golden, No. 98CW448, slip op. at 1-2 (Colo. Water Div. I, June 13, 2001). 
97. See Porzak et al., supra note 4, at 216-220 (summarizing and criticizing the CWCB's 
arguments in the water court). 
98. Id. (explaining Golden's arguments and supporting evidence, including an estimated economic 
benefit of $23 million over time). 
99. In re Water Rights of the City of Golden, No. 98CW448, slip op. at 10. 
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Golden its claimed flow levels up to 1000 cfs.100 On the issue of beneficial use, 
the court found that the Golden course's strong reputation among boaters 
"translates directly into economic value for the City in that it attracts boaters 
from across the State, the Country and even international competitors."101 The 
court also specifically found that the claimed flow levels were reasonable in light 
of Golden's purposes for the course and the recreational and economic benefits 
associated with high flows. I 02 The court concluded that the city's constitutional 
right to appropriate water "may not be denied or limited based on ... policy 
restraints purportedly rooted in concern for the quantities that should be left for 
future water users."103 
The agencies appealed, and the case attracted numerous amici from across 
the state.104 Golden prevailed when the Colorado Supreme Court deadlocked 
three-to-three, thereby automatically affirming the water court.105 The Colorado 
Supreme Court deadlock also meant victory for the ski towns of Vail and 
Breckenridge. Both towns had filed in 2000 to appropriate water for their kayak 
courses on Gore Creek and the Blue River, respectively,106 and had been 
awarded decrees after trial in the water court for Division 5_107 The appeal of 
these decrees was argued while the Golden decision was pending,108 and the 
Colorado Supreme Court announced its three-to-three decision in that appeal on 
the same day as the Golden case.109 As these cases were making their way 
through the courts, however, the Colorado legislature was addressing the issue 
of water rights for whitewater parks. 
I 00. Id. at 4-5 (daytime decreed flow levels, including 1000 cfs for May, June, and July, 559 cfs for 
August, and lower levels for other months). A portion of each month's flow was decreed as "absolute" 
based on proven beneficial use, and a portion was "conditional," reflecting the need to show beneficial 
use at higher flow levels. Id. at 5. 
IO 1. Id. at 6 ("[T]he reputation of the Course is in large part due to the high flows."). 
102. Id. at 7-8. The court also noted that Golden's use was nonconsumptive, that most of the water 
was already required to pass through Golden to meet existing downstream rights, and that Golden had 
made concessions to accommodate a certain amount of future upstream development. Id. at 7. 
103. Id. at IO (citing Colorado Supreme Court cases rejecting the use of public interest 
considerations in determining new water rights). 
104. State Eng'r v. Eagle River Water & Sanitation Dist., 69 P.3d 1027, 1027 (Colo. 2003) (mem.) 
(listing numerous amici curiae and their counsel). 
105. Justice Hobbs did not participate in the decision, leaving only six voting justices. Id. at 1028; 
see Porzak et al., supra note 4, at 226-27 (explaining Golden's motion to disqualify Justice Hobbs, and 
noting that he recused himself after the motion was denied), 227-232 (summarizing each side's arguments 
on appeal). 
106. Id. at 233-34. 
107. Id. at 234-36. The Breckenridge right was decreed at 500 cfs in June, and Vail's at 400 cfs 
from May through July, with lower levels in other months. Knox, supra note 93, at 4. 
108. Id. at 236. 
109. Eagle River, 69 P.3d at 1028. 
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B. The 2001 Statute: Recognizing and Restricting RJCDs, While Limiting 
the CWCB 's role 
While Golden and the CWCB were battling in the water court over the city's 
application, 110 a bill appeared in the Colorado legislature that would have given 
the CWCB much greater control over applications for kayak course water rights. 
In its early versions, Senate Bill 216 (SB 216) empowered the CWCB to 
determine whether a "recreational in-channel diversion" application should be 
granted, denied, or granted for less water than claimed. I I I Although officially 
only a "recommendation" to the water court, the CWCB determination would 
have been difficult to overturn because the bill required the water court to apply 
the deferential standards of judicial review applicable to most state agency 
decisions.112 The bill also would have applied to pending claims 113 and repealed 
most of its own provisions after two years. I 14 
By the time SB 216 became law, however, the legislature had turned the bill 
into an affirmation of kayak course water rights determined through water court 
proceedings. I IS The new law recognized "recreational in-channel diversion" as 
a special type of beneficial use I 16 involving water that is "diverted, captured, or 
110. Porzak et al., supra note 4, at 224 (noting that the bill was introduced during a break in the 
water court trial on the Golden application). 
111. S.B. 01-216, 63d Gen. Assemb., I st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 200 I) (as amended by Senate Public 
Policy and Planning Committee). Section I of the bill as introduced wouid have required an applicant to 
obtain from the CWCB, "following a public hearing, upon such application, a final recommendation as to 
whether the application should be granted, granted with conditions, or denied." Id. This requirement would 
not apply if the claim was for less than 50 cfs. Id. 
112. Id. Section 3 of the bill required the water court, in reviewing the CWCB's recommendation, 
to use "the criteria of section 24-4-106 (6) and (7)." Id. The former provides for review of the decision on 
the record developed in the agency proceeding, and the latter specifies the standards of review, including 
the deferential "arbitrary and capricious" and "substantial evidence" standards endemic to administrative 
law: 
If the court finds no error, it shall affirm the agency action. If it finds that the agency action is 
arbitrary or capricious, a denial of statutory right, contrary to constitutional right, power, 
privilege, or immunity, in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, purposes, or limitations, 
not in accord with the procedures or procedural limitations of this article or as otherwise 
required by law, an abuse or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion, based upon findings 
of fact that are clearly erroneous on the whole record, unsupported by substantial evidence 
when the record is considered as a whole, or otherwise contrary to law, then the court shall 
hold unlawful and set aside the agency action .... 
COLO. REV. STAT.§ 24-4-106(7) (2015). 
113. Colo. S.B. 01-216. Sections 2 and 3 of the bill specified that their provisions applied to 
applications filed on or after December I, 2000. /d. Thus, Golden's 1998 application would have been 
exempted, but the Vail and Breckenridge applications-filed in late December, 2000-would have been 
subject to the bill. 
114. Id. In several places, the bill followed a substantive provision by stating that the preceding 
subsection would be repealed, effective July I, 2003. Id. 
115. Act of June 5, 2001, ch. 305, 2001 Colo. Sess. Laws 1187 ("concerning the establishment of a 
procedure for the adjudication of a recreational in-channel diversion by a local government, and making 
an appropriation therefor."). 
116. § 2, 2001 Colo. Sess. Laws at 1188 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT§ 37-92-103(4) (2015)) 
(adding "recreational in-channel diversion" to definition of beneficial use). 
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controlled, and placed to beneficial use between specific points defined by 
physical control structures ... for a reasonable recreation experience in and on 
the water."117 The CWCB was given authority to make factual findings and a 
recommendation on the application, 1 !8 but the provision giving the agency's 
decision great weight was dropped. Instead, the factual findings were made 
rebuttablel 19 and the recommendation would simply become "part of the record 
to be considered by the water court .... "120 Gone too were the two-year sunset 
provisions. Yet the law also imposed important limitations on recreational 
claims. It defined RICD as "the minimum stream flow ... for a reasonable 
recreation experience in and on the water,"121 and perhaps most significantly, it 
allowed only local governments and water districts to obtain RICD water 
rights.122 
Disputes soon arose over the meaning of SB 216, and the first RICD to be 
decreed under the new law was appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court.123 The 
Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy District had filed for an appropriation 
for a new kayak course on the Gunnison River near the town of Gunnison,124 
claiming flow levels as high as 1500 cfs.125 The CWCB had reviewed the 
application and recommended that it be approved, but only for a flow of 250 cfs 
from May through Septemberl26_a fraction of the district's requested levels. 
The water court, however, found that the district had introduced evidence 
sufficient to overcome the CWCB's findings and decreed the right in the 
requested amounts.127 
117. § 2, 2001 Colo. Sess. Laws at 1189 (codified at§ 37-92-103(10.3)) (definition of recreational 
in-channel diversion). 
118. § 1, 2001 Colo. Sess. Laws at 1187-88 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT.§ 37-92-102(6)(2015)) 
(listing specific factors to be considered by the CWCB in evaluating the application). 
119. § 3, 2001 Colo. Sess. Laws at 1189 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT.§ 37-92-305(13) (2015)) 
(stating the CWCB's findings of fact "shall be presumptive as to such facts, subject to rebuttal by any 
party"). 
120. Id. (codified at§ 37-92-305(16)). 
121. § 2, 2001 Colo. Sess. Laws at 1189 (codified at§ 37-92-103(10.3)) ("'Recreational in-channel 
diversion' means the minimum stream flow as it is diverted, captured, controlled, and placed to beneficial 
use."). 
122. Id. (codified at § 37-92-103(4) (definition of beneficial use), 37-92-103(7) (definition of 
diversion or divert), 37-92-103(10.3) (definition of beneficial use)). These definitions limit the eligible 
entities to counties, municipalities, and certain types of water districts. 
123. See Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., 109 
P.3d 585, 589 (Colo. 2005), superseded by statute in part, S.B. 06-037, 65th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. 
(Colo. 2006)). 
124. "Applicant hopes to draw both locals and tourists, host competitions, enhance Western State 
College's outdoor recreation program, and strengthen the region's overall economy." Id. 
125. The 1500 cfs level was only for two weeks in late June and the first two weeks of July, but the 
claim sought over 1000 cfs from mid-May through mid-July, with lower levels in early May and from 
mid-July through September. Id. at 589 n. I. 
126. Id. at 589 (quoting the CWCB's findings that a flow of250 cfs would create whitewater features 
sufficient to attract experienced kayakers). 
127. Id. at 589-90 (summarizing the water court's findings and decree). 
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On appeal a unanimous Colorado Supreme Court provided a detailed 
interpretation of SB 216.128 One key issue was the meaning of the "minimum 
stream flow ... for a reasonable recreation experience"129 !anguage in the RICO 
definition, and what requirements or limitations it imposed on the quantity of a 
kayak course appropriation. With neither a statutory definition of key terms nor 
a common or accepted usage of"reasonable recreation experience,"130 the court 
dug into the legislative history but found no clear expression oflegislative intent 
regarding the standard for quantifying RlCD rights.131 The court ultimately 
concluded that the water court must first determine that the requested flow 
amounts are objectively "reasonable on the particular stream" where the course 
is located, 132 and if it finds that they are, the water court must then "determine 
the minimum amount of stream flow necessary to accomplish that intended 
recreation experience." 133 
The other key issue before the Colorado Supreme Court in Upper Gunnison 
was the role of the CWCB in evaluating applications for RlCD appropriations. 
Here the court found both the text and the legislative history to be much clearer: 
the legislature "intended for the CWCB to function as a narrowly constrained 
fact-finding and advisory body when it reviews RlCD applications, rather than 
in an unrestricted adjudicatory role." 134 The court noted that SB 216 as 
introduced would have allowed the agency to decide the quantity of a RICD 
appropriation, but that version did not pass.135 The statute instead gave the 
CWCB a "constrained ... [but] not unimportant" role, evaluating each RICD 
application against five specified factors, requiring a "careful, probing 
analysis."136 In conducting this review, the agency must consider the application 
128. Once again there were numerous amicus curiae before the Colorado Supreme Court, roughly 
equally divided between the two sides. Porzak et al., supra note 4, at 241. 
129. The phrasing of the RICO definition, while odd, is similar to the statutory language establishing 
environmental flows as a beneficial use in Colorado: "such minimum flows ... as are required to preserve 
the natural environment to a reasonable degree." COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (2015). 
130. The court observed that the term "reasonable recreation experience" was at least somewhat 
subjective: 
[T]he reasonableness of a given recreation experience such as whitewater kayaking may vary 
by the appropriator's perspective. A casual kayak er, for example, may be satisfied with low to 
moderate flows, while an expert probably demands higher stream flows. Also, some non-
kayakers may consider enough stream flow to merely float the kayak reasonable. 
Upper Gunnison, I 09 P.3d at 599. 
13 I . Id. at 599--602. 
132. "This determination necessarily will vary from application to application, depending on the 
stream involved and the availability of water within the basin." Id. at 602. The court had earlier noted that 
"the reasonableness of an appropriator's sought recreation experience is directly related to the available, 
unappropriated streamflow, thereby depending entirely upon the river basin on which it is sought. 
Consequently, not all rivers and streams in the state may support world-class whitewater courses." Id. 
133. Id. at 603. The court remanded the Upper Gunnison case to the water court to apply this test. 
Id. at 603--04. 
134. Id. at 593. 
135. Id. at 594. 
136. Id. at 595. The five factors relate to the potential effect of the application on Colorado's ability 
to utilize all the water to which it is entitled under interstate compacts; whether the stream reach is 
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as submitted and cannot substitute its own judgment regarding appropriate flow 
levels.137 Yet it failed to follow these mandates in considering the Upper 
Gunnison application,138 and the court concluded that the CWCB's "limitation 
of Applicant's claimed RICD to 250 cfs was a clear violation of SB 216, which 
requires the CWCB to review the application strictly as submitted by the 
applicant, make the requisite statutory findings of fact, and formulate a 
recommendation to the water court."139 
The Upper Gunnison decision left the CWCB with less power than it 
wanted over RICD applications, but the court's direction on 
reasonable/minimum flows gave the agency a clearer basis for challenging large 
claims in the water courts. And the next RICD application to go to trial, filed by 
Steamboat Springs for water rights on the Yampa River,140 was indeed a large 
one, with the city originally claiming up to 1700 cfs.141 The CWCB 
recommended denial, in part because it saw the application as conflicting with 
the "maximum utilization" of Colorado's water resources.142 The CWCB and 
the State Engineer fought hard to have the water court reject or reduce the 
claim.143 The agencies lost, however, because the water court applied the Upper 
Gunnison test and found, among other things, that the city's appropriation would 
not interfere with upstream water development in the Yampa River basin.144 
Unlike the CWCB, the court saw no conflict between the application and 
maximum utilization of Colorado's waters, concluding that the RICD "is 
consistent with and, in fact, promotes the 'maximum utilization' principle in 
Colorado. It is a new, clean use of water on top of, and that works in tandem 
with, existing and future downstream diversions, generating revenue without 
polluting or consuming a single drop."145 After the water court entered the 
appropriate for the intended use; whether there is access to use the stream for recreation; whether the 
application would injure instream flow rights held by the CWCB; and whether the right "would promote 
maximum utilization of waters of the state." Id. at 592 ( quoting COLO. REv. STAT. § 3 7-92-102(5) (2015)). 
137. Id. at 594. 
138. "[T]he CWCB literally ignored the application before it in favor of opining generally on its 
perception of the appropriate stream flow and more reasonable recreation experience." Id. 
139. Id. at 596. 
140. Porzak et al., supra note 4, at 243. 
141. Through settlements with opposing water users, the city agreed to reduce this amount to 1400 
cfs. Id. at 245. 
142. See id. at 244 (citing the CWCB's findings and recommendations on the Steamboat Springs 
application). 
143. "While the CWCB had clearly been a consistent and zealous opponent of all the previous RICO 
water rights, it pulled out all the stops in its opposition to the Steamboat claim." Id. 
144. The city had reached agreement with other water users in the basin to address potential concerns 
about the application's potential impact on upstream development. Id. at 245. With these agreements 
incorporated into the city's decree, the water court found that the appropriation for "the Boating Park 
RICO in accordance with this Decree does not have any material impact on the development of future 
water supplies for existing and future upstream development." Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Decree of the Court at 7, In re Water Rights of the City of Steamboat Springs, ·No. 03CW86 
(Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 6, Mar. 13, 2006). 
145. Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of the Court, supra note 144, at 7. 
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Steamboat Springs decree, the parties agreed on a modified written order in lieu 
of an appeal.146 
As RlCD applicants sought to appropriate relatively high flows on several 
different rivers, 147 the Colorado legislature saw a renewed push to rein in 
whitewater park appropriations. A 2005 bill that would have imposed much 
tougher standards and restrictions on RlCDs passed the Senate but died in the 
House.148 The following year, however, the legislature reached agreement on a 
new RlCD statute. 
C. The 2006 Statute: Adjusting and Clarifying the Standards for New 
RICD Claims 
Senate Bill 37 (SB 37), enacted in 2006,149 largely preserved the existing 
law on RlCD applications, while making some notable revisions in the standards 
applicable to new claims.ISO The statute merits close attention not only because 
SB 37 represents the Colorado legislature's last word on the subject ofRICDs, 
but also because it was enacted with a nearly unanimous vote.151 
The 2006 statute is perhaps most notable for what it did not do. It did not 
change the recognition of RlCDs as a specific type of beneficial use, the ability 
of local governments to pursue RlCD rights for whitewater courses, and the 
authority of the water courts to determine them. It did not authorize the CWCB 
to determine flow levels, as the agency tried to do in Upper Gunnison. And it did 
not impose a statutory cap on the flow leveis that couid be appropriated for a 
RlCD, as the failed 2005 bill would have done.152 In the big picture, the most 
significant policy choice the legislature made was to leave the core of the existing 
RlCD law in place. 
146. Id. at I. The decree recognizes eight different semimonthly flow levels from April 15 through 
August 15, with the highest being 1400 cfs in early June, I 000 cfs in late May, and 650 cfs in early May 
and late June. Id. at 4. 
147. An article by a Colorado state official in 2006 included a table showing pending RICD 
applications. The highest flows were claimed by Salida (on the Arkansas River), up to 1800 cfs; 
Carbondale (on the Roaring Fork River), up to 1600 cfs; and Durango (on the Animas River), up to 1400 
cfs. Knox, supra note 93, at 4. The Arkansas River application, actually filed by Chaffee County for the 
whitewater parks in Buena Vista and Salida, was entered after the applicants settled with all parties, 
including the CWCB. Porzak et al., supra note 4, at 251-54. The terms of the decree are complex, but it 
provides for 1400 cfs for a thirty-day period in early summer, and 1800 cfs for several days in June for 
special events. Id. at 253. 
148. See Porzak et al., supra note 4, at 250-51. 
149. Act of May I I, 2006, ch. 197, 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws 906 (concerning the adjudication of 
recreational in-channel diversions). 
150. § 4, 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws at 909 (stating that the act applies only to "applications for and the 
administration of new recreational in-channel diversions filed on or after the effective date of this act"). 
151. On final passage of SB 37, the vote was thirty-three to zero in the Senate and fifty-nine to six 
in the House. S. JOURNAL, 65th Colo. Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess., at 396-97 (2006); H. JOURNAL, 65th 
Colo. Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess., at 1474 (2006). 
152. S.B. 05-062, 65th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § I (Colo. 2005) (re-engrossed version, Mar. 
I, 2005) (changing definition of beneficial use to specify that water diverted for a RICO in excess of 350 
cfs would be "conclusively deemed to be wasted"). 
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SB 37 did, however, make some notable revisions, which reflect certain 
policy choices about recreational water rights. Although the statute addresses a 
wide range of issues, 153 perhaps the most important provisions promote five 
goals: limiting the role of the CWCB; clarifying the factors for determining and 
quantifying RICO rights; restricting RICD seasons and time periods; allowing 
for modest upstream development; and discouraging larger claims. 
Limiting the role of the CWCB. Given that the CWCB had been leading 
the effort to defeat or reduce large RICO claims, it is remarkable that the 
legislature in SB 37 chose to diminish the agency's role in the determination of 
RICO rights. No longer would the CWCB make a recommendation to the water 
court on whether the application should be granted, cut back, or denied. Instead, 
the agency would only make written findings on three factual issues, two fewer 
than the 2001 statute required.154 SB 37 also eliminated the CWCB's power to 
establish, by rulemaking, new factors that the agency would use to evaluate 
RIC:O claims.155 
Specifying standards for approval and quantification. After the 
C:olorado Supreme C:ourt found the 2001 statute unclear as to the meaning of 
"minimum stream flow" and "reasonable recreation experience,"156 the 
legislature added several details in SB 37. Perhaps most significantly, the statute 
listed five factors that the water court must consider in determining appropriate 
flow amounts for a RICO: the flow needed to accomplish the claimed 
recreational use; benefits to the community; the intent of the appropriator; stream 
size and characteristics; and the total streamflow available at the control 
structures during the period for which the claim is made.157 It also listed five 
criteria on which the water court must make affirmative findings for each RICO 
153. For example, the statute included a new definition of "control structure" that was specific to 
RICDs, and required that "[t]he control structure and its efficiency shall be designed by a professional 
engineer ... or under the direct supervision of a professional engineer, and constructed so that it will 
operate efficiently and without waste to produce the intended and specified reasonable recreation 
experience." Act of May 11, 2006, ch. 197, § 2, 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws 906, 907 (codified at COLO. REV. 
STAT.§ 37-92-103(6.3) (2015)). 
154. The three issues relate to Colorado's ability to use its compact entitlements, material injury to 
instream flow water rights, and maximum utilization of Colorado's water resources. § I, 2006 Colo. Sess. 
Laws at 906-07 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT.§ 37-92-102(6)(2015)). The2001 statute had also required 
the CWCB to make findings regarding the appropriateness of the stream reach for the intended use, and 
whether there was access for recreational use. Id. SB 37 also changed the CWCB's process for evaluating 
these factors, scrapping the requirement of a "public hearing" in favor of a less formal "public meeting." 
Id. 
155. The 2001 statute had listed five factors that the CWCB was to consider in evaluating RICD 
applications, and also provided for consideration of "such other factors as may be determined appropriate 
for evaluation of recreation in-channel diversions and set forth in rules adopted by the board, after public 
notice and comment." SB 37 deleted this provision. Id. 
156. See supra notes 128-133 and accompanying text (discussing the Colorado Supreme Court's 
Upper Gunnison opinion). 
157. § 3, 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws at 908--09 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(13)(b) 
(2015)). This list is not exclusive, as the statute directs the court to "consider all of the factors that bear 
on the reasonableness of the claim," including these five. Id. 
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application, 158 in particular requiring the water court to deny an application that 
"would materially impair the ability of Colorado to fully develop and place to 
consumptive beneficial use its compact entitlements."159 Finally, SB 37 added a 
restrictive detail by defining "reasonable recreation experience" as the use of a 
RICO "for, and limited to, nonmotorized boating."160 
Restricting RICO seasons and time periods. While the 2001 statute was 
silent on the season of use for RICD rights an<l the time periods within RICO 
decrees, SB 37 imposed new restrictions in these areas. As to the season of use, 
the 2006 statute limited RICO rights to the period from April I through Labor 
Day 16 I unless the applicant can show demand before or after those dates. I 62 As 
to time periods, SB 37 required that each time period covered by a RICO decree 
be at least two weeks long unless the applicant can show why a shorter time is 
needed.163 It also limited each time period to one specified flow rate,164 perhaps 
reflecting a concern that overly complex RICO decrees would be too hard to 
administer. 165 
Allowing for some upstream development. A recurring concern with 
RICDs, especially large ones, is that they will foreclose opportunities for 
upstream water development.166 SB 37 addressed this point by allowing for 
certain upstream actions that would reduce flows to the RICO by relatively small 
amounts. Specifically, the statute created a presumption that "subsequent 
appropriations or changes of water rights" will not materially injure a RICO if 
the effect of any individual one "does not exceed one-tenth of one percent of the 
lowest decreed flow rate" for the RICD right, "and the cumulative effects ... of 
all such appropriations or changes do not exceed two percent of the lowest 
decreed flow rate" for the RIC0.167 Thus, a decreed RICO could not block all 
158. These criteria relate to impairment of Colorado's ability to use its compact entitlements; 
maximum utilization of Colorado's water resources; the appropriateness of the stream reach; public access 
for recreational use; and injury to instream flow rights. § 3, 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws at 908 (codified at§ 
3 7-92-305( 13 )(a)). 
159. § 3, 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws at 909 (codified at § 37-92-305(13)(c)). This is one of the five 
factors on which the water court must make affirmative findings, but because it is the only one that the 
statute singles out as requiring denial, it does not appear that denial would be absolutely required in the 
event of a negative finding on one of the other four factors. 
160. § 2, 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws at 907 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT.§ 37-92-103(10.1) (2015)). 
161. Several of the early recreational water rights had decreed flows outside this time period, and a 
few, including Golden's, had decreed flows for all twelve months. See Knox, supra note 93, at 4. 
162. The applicant must "demonstrate that there will be demand for the reasonable recreation 
experience on additional days."§ 2, 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws at 908 (codified at§ 37-92-103(10.3)). 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. In 2006 an official with the Office of the State Engineer expressed concerns regarding 
administration of complex RICO decrees. Knox, supra note 93, at 5-6. 
166. Id. at 3-4. 
167. § 2, 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws at 908 (codified at§ 37-92-103(10.3)). 
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upstream development unless it could rebut the presumption that small 
reductions in flow would not cause material injury.168 
Discouraging larger RICO claims. The failed 2005 bill, which would have 
effectively capped any new RICO right on any stream at 350 cfs,169 showed the 
legislature's interest in limiting the amount of water that could be appropriated 
for this purpose. SB 3 7 also addressed this issue, but its quantity threshold for 
new claims was far less rigid in two key respects. First, SB 37 drew the line in a 
way that was tailored to the size of the stream where the RICO would be located. 
Specifically, the statute set a threshold of 50 percent of the "sum of the total 
average historical volume of water for the stream segment on which the [RICO] 
is located for each day on which a claim is made."170 Second, SB 37 did not 
prohibit RICOs larger than this threshold, but instead imposed two specific 
restrictions on them. The statute limited such rights to three decreed time periods 
for the entire season171_they could otherwise have at least ten172-and 
prohibited the RICO right holder from making a priority call 173 when less than 
85 percent of the decreed flow would be available.174 By imposing these 
restrictions, the legislature apparently sought to discourage new applicants from 
claiming more than half the average flow during the RICO's season of use. 
In sum, SB 37 made only modest changes to the law governing RICO 
appropriations. The provisions defining the role of the CWCB and the standards 
for determining and quantifying rights were not much different from what the 
Colorado Supreme Court stated in Upper Gunnison. 175 The limits on season of 
use and decreed time periods impose modest restrictions on applicants, and the 
allowance for upstream development set low thresholds for its presumption 
168. The statute says only that there "shall be a presumption" of no material injury for effects on the 
RICO below the specified threshold. Id. This presumption is apparently rebuttable, however. See Colo. 
Water Conservation Bd. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., 109 P.3d 585, 596 (Colo. 
2005) (discussing meaning of "presumptive" in 2001 RICO statute, and concluding that presumption is 
rebuttable), superseded by statute in part, S.B. 06-037, 65th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006). 
169. S.8. 05-062, 65th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § I (Colo. 2005) (changing definition of 
beneficial use to specify that water diverted for a RICO in excess of 350 cfs would be "conclusively 
deemed to be wasted"). 
170. § 3, 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws at 908 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT.§ 37-92-305(13)(f) (2015)). 
The statute also required the water court issuing a RICO decree to specify the volume of water 
appropriated for the entire season, by calculating the sum of the daily flow rates and multiplying that 
number by 1.98-thus converting flow in cfs into volume in acre-feet. Id. (codified at§ 37-92-305(13)(e)). 
171. § 3, 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws at 909 (codified at§ 37-92-305(13)(f)). The statute also provides 
that a right exceeding the 50 percent threshold can only have one decreed flow rate for each of the three 
time periods, but the requirement of one flow rate per decreed time period applies to all RICO rights. § 2, 
2006 Colo. Sess. Laws at 908 (codified at§ 37-92-103(10.3)). 
172. The statute allows RICO rights to extend from April I through Labor Day, and allows time 
periods as short as fourteen days, with the possibility of a longer season and shorter time periods. Id. Thus, 
the statute provides up to a five-month season for RICO rights with two time periods per month. 
I 73. A "call," or "priority call," occurs when a senior user is not receiving a full water supply under 
her right, and results in junior users-those with later appropriations, who are no longer "in priority" given 
the limited water supply-being shut off or curtailed so as to ensure that the senior user gets all her water. 
174. § 3, 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws at 909 (codified at§ 37-92-305(13)(f)). 
17 5. See supra notes 134-139 and accompanying text. 
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against injury of RlCD rights.176 While the restrictions on new appropriations 
exceeding the 50 percent threshold were significant, 177 they were not draconian. 
They allowed new RICDs claiming half the historically available flow I 78 without 
any special restrictions, and they allowed even larger RICDs to be decreed for 
up to three time periods. Viewed as a whole, the 2006 statute reflected a policy 
preference for smaller and simpler RICD rights, but still allowed applicants that 
could meet specific standards to appropriate as much water as needed for their 
intended recreational uses. 
The enactment of SB 37 basically ended a period of rapid evolution in 
Colorado law regarding in-channel recreational water rights. That evolution 
began with the Fort Collins decision and accelerated when Golden filed its 
application seeking high flows for its whitewater park on Clear Creek. From 
2000 through 2006 there were a dozen new applications, several water court 
trials, two Colorado Supreme Court cases, and most importantly, two statutes 
that established the framework for new claims. Part JII considers the results of 
this flurry of activity, summarizing developments since 2006 and outlining the 
current status of RlCDs in Colorado. 
Ill. THE CURRENT STATUS OF WHITEWATER PARK WATER RIGHTS IN 
COLORADO 
According to the CWCB, Colorado had eighteen whitewater courses with 
decreed appropriations as of2015.!79 They can be found in nearly every part of 
the state; six of Colorado's seven regional water courts have decreed at least one 
RlCD right. I SO There is also a fair bit of variation among these rights. Several 
predate legislative recognition of RICD rights, 18 I but most of them were filed in 
176. Moreover, the statute allowed RICD applicants to show the need for a longer season or shorter 
time periods, and established only a "presumption" of no injury to RICD rights from small-impact 
upstream actions.§ 2, 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws at 908 (codified at§ 37-92-103(10.3)). 
177. See Porzak et al., supra note 4, at 255 (describing these provisions as "[p]erhaps the most 
significant change [to SB 37 as introduced] made in the House that was ultimately enacted into law"). 
178. The statute imposed these restrictions only if the RICD right "exceeds" the 50 percent 
threshold.§ 3, 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws Ch. at 909, (codified at§ 37-92-305(13)(t)). 
179. E-mail from Suzanne M. Sellers, Prof! Eng'r., Program Manager, Colo. Water Conservation 
Bd., to author (July 8, 2014) (on file with author) [hereinafterCWCB 2014 RICD spreadsheet] (source of 
this information is the undated and untitled spreadsheet with information on Colorado whitewater parks 
and RICD water rights attached to this email). The spreadsheet shows twenty decreed rights, two of which 
are for the "Nature Dam" and the "Power Dam" in Fort Collins, which are not part of a whitewater park. 
See id. 
180. Although nine of the twenty decreed rights as of 2014 are in Division 5 (Colorado River 
mainstem and smaller tributaries), and five more are in Division I (South Platte and its tributaries), there 
is at least one decreed RICO in all others except Division 3 (Rio Grande). Id. Three divisions have a single 
RICD right: Division 4 (Upper Gunnison River Water Conservation District on the Gunnison), Division 
6 (Steamboat Springs on the Yampa), and Division 7 (Durango on the Animas). 
181. For the twenty decreed RICDs, eight were filed in 2000 or earlier. Id. Fort Collins holds the 
earliest decrees--one each for the "Power Dam" and the "Nature Dam." See generally supra Part II.A. 
The City of Littleton filed in 1994 for a park on the South Platte River and received a decree for I 00 cfs 
year-round. CWCB 2014 RICD spreadsheet, supra note 179. Golden filed its pathbreaking application on 
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2001 (the year of the original statute) or later.182 And although some rights, 
especially the early ones, are modest in size, I 83 most of them appropriate 
relatively high flows. I 84 
The largest RICD claim yet-filed in 2013 by Glenwood Springs for three 
different whitewater parks on the Colorado River185_is pending in the water 
court. While the maximum flow claimed, 4000 cfs, is startlingly large even by 
RICO standards, 186 the application gives reason to believe that the city's goals 
are far more modest. The 4000 cfs flow is only for special events, and would be 
good for no more than five days per year; otherwise, the maximum flow level is 
2500 cfs.187 Moreover, the application states that the city seeks to appropriate no 
more than 50 percent of the average historical flow during the period of the 
decreel88 (thus avoiding the statutory restrictions on larger rightsI89), and 
estimates that "this is expected to result in no more than 46 days a year with flow 
rates in excess of 1250 c.f.s."190 Thus, the city's claim of2500 cfs from April 30 
through July 23-a period of eighty-five days-may end up being substantially 
Clear Creek in 1998. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text. In 2000 three applications were filed 
in the Division 5 water court for courses in Vail, Breckenridge, and Aspen. CWCB 2014 RICO 
spreadsheet, supra note 179 ( the first two digits in a water court case number, coming just before the 
letters "CW," indicate the year in which the case was filed). 
182. CWCB 2014 RICO spreadsheet, supra note 179 (showing twelve decreed RICDs with filing 
dates from 2001 through 2010). 
183. The smallest decrees are the oldest, those of Fort Collins (maximum 30 cfs on the Poudre, filed 
in 1986) and Littleton (JOO cfs on the South Platte, filed in 1994). Other decrees with relatively low 
maximum flow rates include those of Aspen (350 cfs on the Roaring Fork, filed in 2000) and Pueblo (500 
cfs on the Arkansas, filed in 200 I). Id. 
184. The largest decreed flow rate, 1800 cfs, is held by Chaffee County, for the Buena Vista and 
Salida whitewater parks on the Arkansas River. Id.; see supra note 147 and accompanying text 
(summarizing the Chaffee County decree). Several other RICO rights have decreed maximum flow rates 
of 1000 cfs or greater: those of Carbondale (1600 cfs on the Roaring Fork), Grand County (1500 cfs on 
the Colorado in Gore Canyon), Steamboat Springs (1400 cfs on the Yampa), Durango (1400 cfs on the 
Animas), Avon (1400 cfs on the Eagle), Pitkin County (1350 cfs on the Roaring Fork), Upper Gunnison 
(1200 cfs on the Gunnison), and Golden (I 000 cfs on Clear Creek). Some of the rights with smaller flows 
are nonetheless sizable in relation to the streams where the courses are located, such as those of 
Silverthorne (600 cfs on the Blue River), Vail (400 cfs on Gore Creek), and Longmont (350 cfs on St. 
Vrain Creek). CWCB 2014 RICO spreadsheet, supra note 179. 
185. Application for Surface Water Rights for Recreational In-Channel Uses, In re Water Rights of 
the City of Glenwood Springs, No. I 3CW3109 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 5, filed Dec. 31, 2013) 
[hereinafter Glenwood Application]. 
186. The highest flow in any existing decree is Chaffee County's 1800 cfs on the Arkansas. CWCB 
2014 RICD spreadsheet, supra note 179. That number is somewhat misleading, however, as that is a 
"special event" flow good for a maximum of eight days in the early summer; otherwise, the high flow in 
that decree is 1400 cfs. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
187. These five days of event flows at 4000 cfs would occur between May 11 and July 6; otherwise, 
the maximum flow claimed is 2500 cfs, for the period of April 30 through July 23. Glenwood Application, 
supra note 185, at 3. 
188. Id. at 7. 
189. See supra notes 152, 170--174 and accompanying text. 
190. Glenwood Application, supra note 185, at 7 (stating that this estimate is based on "preliminary 
engineering"). 
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reduced in duration, flow level, or both.191 Except for a few weeks of high flows, 
then, the city says it seeks to appropriate no more than 1250 cfs, 192 a level within 
the range of several existing decrees.193 
As of the summer of 2015, the Glenwood Springs claim was the only 
pending application in Colorado for a new RICO right, and the only one filed 
since the end of2010.194 Although there was never a flurry of new applications, 
the pace has clearly slowed in recent years. From 2000 through 2006, one to three 
new RICD applications were filed each year, involving a total of thirteen new 
whitewater courses. From 2007 through 2013, however, only two years saw any 
applications for a new RICD appropriation, involving a total of six whitewater 
courses. I 95 Colorado has several other whitewater courses for which a local 
government could potentially pursue a RlCD decree, but never has.196 While 
there are undoubtedly several factors influencing the decline in new 
applications, 197 the most obvious explanation is that the 2006 statute has had a 
chilling effect on new RlCD claims--especially since the two applications that 
year were filed in February and May,198 just prior to the signing of SB 37.199 
191. Glenwood has officially notified the CWCB that it is pursuing negotiations with objectors in 
the case and working with CWCB staff in an effort to resolve objections, and has asked the CWCB to 
postpone consideration of its application pending those discussions. Letter from Christopher L. Thome, 
Holland & Hart LLP, to Suzanne Sellers, Prof I Eng'r., Program Manager, Colo. Water Conservation Bd. 
(March 19, 2014) (on file with author). 
192. Glenwood Application, supra note 185, at 3 (claiming a six-month season from April I through 
September 30, with a low flow level of 1250 before April 30 and after July 23). 
193. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
194. Id.; e-mail from Suzanne M. Sellers, Profl Eng'r., Program Manager, Colo. Water 
Conservation Bd., to author (Feb. 11, 2015) (on file with author) (confirming Glenwood Springs had the 
only pending RICD application at that time). 
195. Prior to Glenwood Springs' application in 2013 (for three whitewater courses on the Colorado 
River), the only applications in that period were in 2010, by Grand County (for the Hot Sulphur Springs 
and Gore Canyon whitewater parks on the Colorado River) and Pitkin County (for the Pitkin County River 
Park on the Roaring Fork). See e-mail from Suzanne M. Sellers, supra note 194. 
196. Id. (listing whitewater parks in Ridgway, Denver, Pagosa Springs, Boulder, Canon City, 
Glenwood Springs, Lawson, and Estes Park; the pending Glenwood Springs application is also listed). It 
would require further research on these individual parks to determine if any one might qualify as a RICO, 
and if so, why the responsible local government has not filed an application. 
197. It is certainly possible that most of the local governments that were most strongly interested in 
securing RICO appropriations simply acted quickly once this type of right was recognized, leaving fewer 
potential applicants by the late 2000s. 
198. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree at I, In re Water Rights of the City of 
Durango, No. 06CW9 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 7, Nov. 30, 2007) (application filed Feb. 28, 2006); 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Ruling of the Referee, Judgment and Decree at I, In re Water 
Rights of the Town of Carbondale, No. 06CW077 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 5, Jan. 6, 2014) (application 
filed May 2, 2006). Durango, at least, expedited its application so as to file before the bill could take effect. 
Kim McGuire, Bill May Derail New Kayak Parks, DENY. POST, (Feb. 17, 2006, 1:00 AM), 
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_35l8270 (quoting Durango city official). 
199. The governor signed SB 37 on May 11, 2006. COLO. GEN. ASSEMBLY, SUMMARIZED BILL 
HISTORY FOR BILL NUMBER S806-037, http://www.leg.state.co.us/CLICS2006Ncs1.nst7fsbillcont3/ 
4981C94D5B354A298725707600693A91 ?Open&file=037_enr.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2015) (select 
"History" link at top of page). 
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Another important change in RICO practice also began in 2006: major 
applications started being resolved by settlement rather than going to trial in the 
water courts. The shift to negotiated agreements on large claims may have 
begun200 with the Chaffee County claims on the Arkansas River, which were 
settled and decreed in 2006 despite involving the highest flow levels of any RICD 
application ever.20! Over the next two years the sizable appropriations of 
Silverthorne on the Blue River,202 Durango on the Animas River,203 and Avon 
on the Eagle River204 were decreed based on settlements with all the objecting 
parties. In 2014 decrees were entered based on settlement of major RICD 
appropriations on the Roaring Fork (applications by Carbondale205 and Pitkin 
County206) and the Colorado River mainstem (Grand County's application2D7 
involving two whitewater parks). These negotiated agreements have produced 
detailed terms and conditions that are set forth in the resulting decrees. 208 
The record of settlements beginning in 2006 seems to reflect a greater 
acceptance of RICO claims by the CWCB. The agency spent years as the chief 
200. One could argue that the move toward settlements actually began in 2004, when Longmont 
obtained its RICO decree on St. Vrain Creek on the basis of stipulations with all the objecting parties. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Ruling of the Referee and Decree of the Water Court, at 2, In 
re Water Rights of the City of Longmont, No. 2001CW275 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. I, Dec. 7, 2004) 
(listing all objectors and stipulations). 
201. See Porzak et al., supra note 4, at 251-54. The much smaller Pueblo RICO right (maximum 
flow 500 cfs), on the Arkansas River downstream of Chaffee County, was also entered in 2006 on the 
basis of stipulations with the objectors. Findings ofFact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree at 8, In re Water 
Rights of Pueblo, Case No. 0ICWl60 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 2, April 5, 2006) (decree entered into 
based on compromise and settlement). 
202. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree at 10, In re Water Rights of the Town of 
Silverthorne, No. 04CW2 l 7 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 5, Oct. 7, 2007) (terms and conditions of decree 
based on negotiation, compromise, and settlement). 
203. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree at 2, In re Water Rights of the 
City of Durango, No. 06CW9 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 7, Nov. 30, 2007) (Durango has entered into 
stipulations with all objectors). 
204. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree at 2, In re Water Rights of the 
Town of Avon, No. 2005CW258 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 5, May 6, 2008) (all parties have stipulated 
to entry of decree). 
205. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Ruling of the Referee, Judgment and Decree at 2, In re 
Water Rights of the Town of Carbondale, No. 06CW077 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 5, Jan. 6, 2014) 
(water court decree entered Feb. 3, 2014) (listing objectors and stipulations). 
206. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree at 2, In re Water Rights of the Bd. of Cty. 
Comm'rs of Pitkin Cty., No. 2010CW305 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 5, June 12, 2014) (listing objectors, 
withdrawn statement of opposition and stipulations). 
207. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree at 20, In re Water Rights of the 
Bd. of Comm'rs for the Cty. of Grand, No. 2010CW298 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 5, Jan. 10, 2014) 
("The findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree in this matter were completed as a result of 
substantial discussions, negotiations, and compromises by, between and among the Applicant and several 
objectors pertaining to all parts of the findings, conclusions and decree"). 
208. See, e.g., Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree at 8, 11-12, 14-17, In 
re Water Rights of the Bd. ofComm'rs for the Cty. of Grand, No. 2010CW298 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water 
Div. 5, Jan. 10, 2014) (listing terms and conditions); Findings ofFact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree at 
4-7, In re Water Rights of the Town of Silverthorne, No. 04CW2 l 7 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 5, Oct. 
7, 2007) (listing terms and conditions, and setting forth stipulations with specific objectors). 
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opponent of new RICD claims in the water courts209 and, along with the State 
Engineer, was the appellant in all of the Colorado Supreme Court's RJCD 
cases.210 To this day the CWCB seemingly remains unhappy about the 
established RICO rights.211 But over the past several years the agency has been 
willing to accept new decrees on the basis of terms and conditions that allow for 
desired upstream development,212 indicating that its approach to RICDs has 
shifted from determined opposition to pragmatic engagement Indeed, the 
CWCB's original draft Colorado Water Plan called RICDs "important, effective 
tools" for meeting recreational water needs, and stated that the agency would 
"continue to support local governments on [R.lCDs] through technical 
consultation and funding where appropriate."213 The development-oriented 
209. The CWCB and State Engineer continued to oppose Golden's application after all the water 
users had settled with the city, based on the agencies' "firm position that in-channel water rights for 
recreation purposes could not be decreed to the City under Colorado law. As one State witness explained, 
the only acceptable term and condition ever offered by the State in settlement was that Golden withdraw 
the application." Porzak et al., supra note 4, at 216. The CWCB also pushed for denial of the Upper 
Gunnison application in the water court, see supra notes 123-127 and accompanying text, and fought hard 
against the Steamboat Springs claim: "The CWCB's strategy was clear-not only kill the Steamboat 
RICO, but at the same time make the litigation process as expensive as possible." Porzak et al., supra note 
4, at 244. In that article, Glenn Porzak and his co-authors-attorneys who were probably the leading 
proponents ofRICD claims-repeatedly portrayed the CWCB as their primary antagonist. See id. at 243-
47 (describing the CWCB's opposition to the Steamboat claim as ''vehement" and "strident"), 249 
(criticizing rules adopted by the CWCB as "an astonishing action by a board that had just been 
reprimanded by the Colorado Supreme Court" in the Upper Gunnison case, but "entirely consistent with 
the CWCB 's behavior in its publicly-funded campaign against recreation water rights"). The CWCB did, 
however, settle with Longmont in 2004 on its substantial RICO claim on St. Vrain Creek. See Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Ruling of the Referee and Decree of the Water Court, at 7, In re Water 
Rights of the City of Longmont, No. 2001CW275 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. I, Dec. 7, 2004). 
210. See supra notes 104-109 and accompanying text (appeals of the Golden, Vail, and 
Breckenridge decrees), 128-139 and accompanying text (appeal of the Upper Gunnison decree). 
211. The only commentary on RICDs currently posted on the CWCB website is the following: "The 
size and magnitude of flows protected by many of the RICO water rights to date have the potential to 
restrict future upstream development potential and may reduce the flexibility that Colorado has to manage 
its water resources." Recreational In-Channel Diversions, COLO. WATER CONVERSATION BD., 
http://cwcb.state.co.us/environment/recreational-in-channel-diversions/Pages/main.aspx (last visited Feb. 
11, 2015). Otherwise the CWCB web pages on RICDs focus almost entirely on the existing statutes, rules, 
and decrees. 
212. Although Longmont's application was settled earlier, see supra note 200, the much larger 
Chaffee County claim was perhaps the earliest instance of the CWCB accepting a negotiated agreement 
on a major new RICD decree. See Porzak et al., supra note 4, at 251-54 (describing terms and conditions 
of the negotiated decree accepted by the CWCB). More recent examples include the Pitkin County 
application on the Roaring Fork and Grand County's application on the Colorado. Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Decree at 2, In re Water Rights of the Bd. ofCty. Comm'rs of Pitkin Cty., No. 
2010CW305 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 5, June 12, 2014); Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
Judgment and Decree at 20, In re Water Rights of the Bd. of Comm'rs for the Cty. of Grand, No. 
2010CW298 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 5, Jan. 10, 2014). 
213. COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., COLORADO'S WATER PLAN 81,266 (2015) (first draft) (on 
file with author). 
782 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 42:753 
CWCB214 may never be a booster of RICDs, but it now appears increasingly 
willing to accept their existence and even acknowledge their value. 
While RICD activity has slowed in the courts, it has stopped in the 
legislature. Not only has no new RICD statute been enacted since SB 37, but it 
also appears that no substantive bill on this subject has even been introduced 
since 2006.215 With new applications in the following years few and far 
between,216 there has seemingly been little need or urgency for new legislation. 
SB 37, which tackled a controversial topic and passed with only a handful of 
dissenting votes, 217 appears to be the kind of finely balanced policy deal218 that 
stands the test of time. After passing two significant bills in six years which 
created and fine-tuned the law on water rights for whitewater courses, the 
legislature has not returned to the issue for nearly a decade. 
Thus, the legal and policy debates in Colorado over the legitimacy and size 
of whitewater park water rights have subsided. Since 2001 state law specifically 
allows for these rights while limiting them to local governments. Today, there is 
a substantial number of decreed RICD water rights scattered across the state, but 
there have been few new applications in recent years. For the past decade, RICD 
claims have been resolved on the basis of negotiated agreements rather than 
trials. And since the compromise amendments to the RICD statute of 2006, all 
has been quiet on the legislative front. 1n sum, Colorado has accepted the idea of 
water rights for whitewater parks, giving communities the option of securing an 
appropriation for recreational flows that can boost their economy and quality of 
life. Part IV offers some observations about Colorado's experience with the issue 
of in-channel water rights for recreation. 
214. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text (describing the water development focus of the 
CWCB's authorizing statute). 
215. The Colorado Water Congress tracks water-related bills in every Colorado legislative session, 
summarizing relevant bills from both houses in a single document, and maintains an online archive from 
prior sessions. From 2007 to the 2015 session ( ongoing as of this writing), none of these documents shows 
an introduced bill addressing RICDs. See Previous legislative Summaries, Cow. WATER CONG., 
http://web.cowatercongress.org/about/previous _legislative_ summaries_ and_ bills.aspx (last visited Oct. 
31, 2015) (sessions from 1993 through 2013); 2015 State Water legislation, COLO. WATER CONG., 
http://www.cowatercongress.org/state-iss ues.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2015) (2015 session). 
216. Of the few new applications filed since 2006, all have been in the same court (Water Division 
5), and all but one involved the same river, the Colorado. The other, from Pitkin County, was on the 
Roaring Fork, where there was already one decreed RICO right (Aspen's) and one pending application 
(Carbondale's) at the time of filing. CWCB 2014 RICO spreadsheet, supra note 179. If the new 
applications had involved rivers in different parts of the state, especially in areas with no prior experience 
with RICDs, they might have generated greater concern. 
21 7. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
218. "As the bill was finally enacted, everyone seemed to feel it was an acceptable compromise." 
Porzak et al., supra note 4, at 256. 
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IV. CONCLUDING 08SERV A TIONS ON WHITEWATER PARK WATER 
RIGHTS IN COLORADO 
Water rights for whitewater parks have become established in Colorado but 
are still unknown in the other western states. The fact that Colorado, with its 
distinctly old-school approach to water law, remains the only state to recognize 
these rights is either deeply ironic or entirely fitting, depending on one's view of 
whitewater parks. If one sees them as representing modern values regarding the 
public amenities that people want from rivers, then it seems bizarre that water 
rights for recreational boating originated in Colorado, given its constitutional 
right to appropriate, its emphasis on property rights, and its lack of public interest 
standards for appropriation. If one sees them instead as water infrastructure that 
supports economic activity by drawing people and money to a community, then 
Colorado---with its utilitarian, user-driven water law and its important 
recreational economy-is the natural pioneer for this new type of water right. 
Ironic or not, whitewater park water rights would not have developed as 
they did if not for Colorado's unique approach to new appropriations. In other 
western states, any new appropriation requires a permit issued by a state agency, 
and the agency must determine that the application meets certain statutory 
criteria.219 Had applicants in Colorado needed the assent of a state agency for 
their whitewater park claims, they would have been disappointed, at least if they 
sought to appropriate high flows.220 And in most states, had the responsible water 
agency denied a requested permit or issued it for much lower flows than 
requested, any judicial review would likely have proceeded under the deferential 
standards that typically apply to this type ofadrninistrative decision.221 As it was, 
Colorado's agencies strongly opposed the early high-flow claims by Golden, 
Steamboat Springs, and others, but because the agencies had only fact-finding 
and advisory roles, they had limited influence in the water courts. And while the 
agencies were concerned about the potential impact of RJCD rights on future 
upstream uses, the water courts were precluded by statute and judicial precedent 
from considering such "public interest" arguments. Instead, the water courts 
applied the statutes, determined that whitewater parks would indeed "control" 
219. GETCHES, supra note 28, at 151 (noting that all prior appropriation states except Colorado 
require a pennit), 155-56 (outlining typical statutory criteria for issuance of pennit). 
220. The agencies might have been willing to approve applications for low flow levels, as indicated 
by the CWCB's settlement with Fort Collins. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. The CWCB also 
eventually stipulated to the entry of a decree in the next application for in-channel recreational rights, 
whereby the City of Littleton appropriated a very modest I 00 cfs for each of the three boat chutes on the 
South Platte River. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Ruling of the Referee and Decree of the Water 
Court at 4, In re Water Rights of the City of Littleton, No. 94CW273 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. I, Sept. 
7, 2000) (water court decree entered Sept. 29, 2000). 
221. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (noting deferential standards applied by courts 
reviewing state water agency decisions in most other western states). The original version of SB 216 
would have specified deferential standards for water court review of the CWCB 's decision on a RICO 
application. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
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water in its natural course for a recognized (and economically valuable) 
beneficial use, and issued decrees accordingly. 
Fourteen years after Colorado's first RICO statute, no other western state 
has specifically recognized water rights for recreational boating courses, even 
though engineered whitewater parks exist in at least five other western states.222 
For now, the other states are following western water law orthodoxy, taking the 
view that whitewater parks might be valuable, but that they do not and should 
not have water rights. Under this view, allowing local governments to 
appropriate high flows for recreation is bad policy, because it may foreclose 
opportunities for consumptive water development later on. These arguments are 
important in Colorado, which is fully and deeply committed to protecting its 
ability to use all of the water to which it is entitled under various interstate 
compacts.223 But remarkably, these arguments did not stop the water courts from 
decreeing whitewater park appropriations or stop the legislature from 
recognizing RICOs by statute. The 2006 legislation did require denial of any new 
RICO right that would "materially impair" Colorado's ability to use its compact 
entitlements,224 clearly showing that even future consumptive uses of water take 
priority over recreational uses. But rather than prohibit RICO claims entirely for 
that reason, the legislature chose to impose an additional standard on them, which 
has not prevented local governments from making significant new appropriations 
for whitewater parks. 
Wes tern water law has always rewarded the application of water to some 
economically productive beneficial use, and in Colorado, early applicants for 
recreational water rights strongly emphasized the economic importance of 
whitewater parks for their communities.225 Western water orthodoxy might 
222. See Whitewater Kayak Parks, BORNTOPADDLE.COM, http://www.bomtopaddle.com/ 
whitewaterparks.php (last visited Feb. 13, 2015) (listing whitewater parks in Montana, Nevada, Utah, 
Wyoming, and several in Colorado). This list is certainly incomplete, however, as it excludes several of 
Colorado's parks, including popular ones in Salida and Durango. It also does not include a relatively new 
whitewater park on the Boise River in Idaho. See Welcome to the Boise River Park, BOISE RIVER PARK, 
http://www.boiseriverpark.com (last visited Feb. 13, 2013). It does not appear that there is a complete list 
of whitewater parks in the West, but clearly they are not unique to Colorado. 
223. Protecting the state's compact entitlements remains a top priority of Colorado water policy. For 
example, in his executive order directing the CWCB to begin developing the first Colorado Water Plan, 
Governor John W. Hickenlooper noted, "Our interstate water concerns are as pressing as ever and require 
Colorado to be vigilant in protecting its interstate water rights pursuant to its nine interstate compacts and 
two equitable apportionment decrees." COLO. WATER CONSERVATION Bo., supra note 3, at app. A at 3. 
The draft plan itself leaves no doubt about the central importance of this point: "The goals of the water 
plan are to defend Colorado's compact entitlements, improve the regulatory processes, and explore 
financial incentives all while honoring Colorado's water values and ensuring that the state's most valuable 
resource is protected and available for generations to come." Id. at 6. 
224. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
225. Porzak et al., supra note 4, at 218-19 (presenting economic argument for Golden application, 
including an estimate of $23 million in economic value). In arguing for the economic importance of 
whitewater courses for the mountain towns of Vail and Breckenridge, the attorney for these applicants 
told the Colorado Supreme Court, "(T]he greater the flow, the greater the dough, for the State as a whole." 
Id. at 237. 
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admit that such recreational uses are economically and legally beneficial but still 
reject the idea of appropriations for whitewater parks, perhaps because they lack 
a typical diversion or because they require too much water. In other words, 
traditional western water law would say that whitewater parks might be valuable, 
but they can't have water rights. The practical problem with that view is that 
western water law based on prior appropriation focuses on water rights to the 
exclusion of nearly everything else, and offers little orno protection to those who 
lack them. It is said that when the only tool one has is a hammer, every problem 
starts to look like a nail. And so long as the western states continue to see water 
management solely as a matter of water rights, those who need water for 
economically valuable uses have little choice but to pursue such rights, as 
Colorado's local governments have done for their whitewater parks. 
Given that Colorado's courts began recognizing in-channel recreational 
water rights even before the 2001 RICD statute, it is possible that whitewater 
park appropriations could be secured under existing law in other states. To 
answer that question for any given state would require a detailed analysis of that 
state's water statutes, case law, and administrative rules and precedent, even 
before addressing the site-specific questions that would arise in connection with 
an application for a particular whitewater park. In general, however, the 
questions in any state would be much the same: (l) ls recreational boating a 
beneficial use? (2) Do in-channel structures creating whitewater features satisfy 
any legal requirements for diverting or controlling water? (3) Would the 
proposed use of water harm the public interest? 
Starting with Fort Collins, the Colorado courts were able to answer the first 
two questions affirmatively, but did not address the third because that state lacks 
a public interest test for new appropriations. On the first two issues, the water 
agencies and courts of other states might consider Fort Collins at least somewhat 
persuasive; on the public interest point, Colorado's legislative recognition of 
RICDs might help make the case that whitewater park rights are sound policy. 
That said, although the Colorado experience is relevant for other parts of the 
West, other states will recognize whitewater park water rights only if they make 
sense at the local level. Thus, proponents across the region might be best served 
by emphasizing (as Colorado's applicants did) that whitewater parks are 
economically valuable, nonconsumptive, popular, and good for the communities 
in which they are located. 
Colorado's experience strongly suggests that whitewater parks can be 
successfully integrated into the water rights framework of a western state that 
follows the prior appropriation doctrine. Whitewater recreation would represent 
a new type of claim on water resources ( although not a new use), but water rights 
for this purpose would be both nonconsumptive and very junior in priority.226 
226. Because of their junior priorities, whitewater park rights would be less potentially disruptive 
than reserved water rights under the Winters doctrine, which apply to federal and tribal lands designated 
by the U.S. government for a particular pmpose. Because reserved rights typically have a priority date 
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The quantities involved may be substantial, but would not necessarily disrupt 
existing water management practices, especially in areas where downstream 
senior rights already require large volumes of water to pass through the 
whitewater park. 227 And while recreational rights could potentially limit or 
complicate upstream water development actions, Colorado has shown that these 
concerns can be managed through statutory requirements for new claims, as well 
as through case-by-case negotiations to resolve issues arising from a particular 
appropriation. 
For now, Colorado remains the only state to allow local governments to 
obtain water rights for whitewater parks, even though communities elsewhere in 
the West have invested in these courses. More of these parks may spring up as 
communities look to attract recreational visitors and diversify their economies. 
If whitewater parks grow in popularity and in economic value, can western water 
law accommodate them with water rights geared to their needs? That challenge 
will test the flexibility and adaptability of prior appropriation, which has been 
touted for its ability to change with the times. 228 The Colorado experience is 
instructive, as RICD water rights over the past decade have gone from being 
hotly disputed to generally accepted. To use a kayaking metaphor, whitewater 
park rights have successfully run a string of tough rapids, and are now floating 
through calmer waters. 
tied to the date of the federal designation, these rights may be senior to some established uses, such that 
recognizing reserved rights may pose a threat to existing junior users who may lose water to a new senior 
call. See GETCHES, supra note 28, at 332 (explaining how reserved water rights may have earlier priority 
dates than established uses under prior appropriation). 
227. The water courts made a point of this factor in issuing the Golden and Steamboat Springs RICO 
decrees, which involved high flow levels on Clear Creek and the Yampa River, respectively. In the Golden 
case, the water court noted that the water claimed for the city's kayak course would always be available 
for downstream uses, and found, "[i]n a dry water year, I 00 [percent] of the water claimed for the Course 
is already subject to a downstream senior call. In an average water year, 84% of the water that passes 
through the Golden Course is subject to such a call." In re Water Rights of the City of Golden, No. 
98CW448, slip op. at 7 (Colo. Water Div. I, June 13, 2001). And the water court concluded that the 
Steamboat Springs appropriation would be "a new, clean use of water on top of, and that works in tandem 
with, existing and future downstream diversions." Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of the Court at 7, In re Water Rights of the City of Steamboat Springs, No. 03CW86 (Colo. Dist. 
Ct., Water Div. 6, Mar. 13, 2006). 
228. As Colorado Supreme Court Justice Greg Hobbs wrote, "State water law systems are 
continually evolving to incorporate the changing customs and values of the people." Gregory J. Hobbs, 
Jr., Priority: The Most Misunderstood Stick in the Bundle, 32 ENVTL. L. 37, 55 (2002); see also A. Dan 
Tarlock, The Future of Prior Appropriation in the New West, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 769, 770 (2001) 
(noting that prior appropriation has always changed with the times). 
We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response for our online 
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articles may be viewed at our website, http://www.ecologylawquarterly.org. 
